Abstrak
Transformasi hukum terhadap Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) melalui Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2025 tentang Perubahan Ketiga atas Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2003 tentang Badan Usaha Milik Negara (Perubahan Ketiga UU BUMN) telah menciptakan fleksibilitas kelembagaan yang signifikan, namun sekaligus menimbulkan risiko moral hazard akibat lemahnya sistem pengawasan dan akuntabilitas publik. Studi-studi sebelumnya lebih banyak menyoroti inefisiensi birokrasi dan praktik korupsi dalam BUMN, namun belum secara sistematis mengevaluasi konsekuensi hukum dan tata kelola pasca pergeseran dari kerangka hukum keuangan negara ke kerangka hukum korporasi. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjawab bagaimana desain regulasi dalam Perubahan Ketiga UU BUMN membuka ruang penyimpangan tata kelola dan apa implikasinya terhadap efektivitas sistem antikorupsi. Dengan pendekatan normatif-doktrinal, tulisan ini menganalisis ketentuan hukum nasional, membandingkannya dengan praktik tata kelola Temasek (Singapura) dan Statens Pensjonsfond Utland (Norwegia), serta menilai kecukupan norma berdasarkan teori agency, regulatory capture, dan prinsip good governance. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa absennya kontrol publik yang kuat membuka celah sistemik bagi penyalahgunaan kewenangan. Studi ini merekomendasikan tata kelola hibrida yang mengintegrasikan efisiensi korporasi dan akuntabilitas publik melalui penguatan peraturan turunan, pengawasan multi-lapis, dan partisipasi masyarakat sipil. Tulisan ini berkontribusi secara konseptual terhadap reformulasi sistem pengawasan BUMN di tengah konteks deregulasi.
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